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Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority should have overruled Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery. 
Despite general talk of a "new federalism," we have heard little 
from law professors about how, and within what legal framework, 
powers, resources and activities should be divided among federal, 
state, and local authorities so as best to serve the diverse needs of 
our people. 
I also think that constitutional scholarship commands a dis-
proportionate share of scarce, intellectual resources in the law 
schools. After all, the Supreme Court is not the most important 
maker of public policy. The legislatures that created the welfare 
state and protected civil rights have done more to promote equality 
than even the Supreme Court. Too little attention, relatively speak-
ing, is being paid to their work or the political processes that ac-
count for it. For example, there is much more writing urging the 
Supreme Court to read an economic bill of rights (not President 
Reagan's version) into the Constitution than about the legislation 
and administrative structure that would be needed practically to 
guarantee to all people jobs, health care, education, and the other 
necessities that the advocates of an economic bill of rights have in 
mind. It is a shame, too, that the debate about the social functions 
of private law has been left almost entirely to the adherents of Law 
and Economics and Critical Legal Studies. 
KIRK EMMERT35 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to foresee the issues, political 
configuration, and constitutional direction which will dominate the 
Supreme Court in the next decade or more. But there is little doubt 
that one of the most important questions underlying the activities of 
the Court, and scholarship about it, will be its role in our constitu-
tional liberal democracy. In recent years this question has been ex-
plored in greater depth than at any other time in our history, with 
the exception perhaps of the New Deal, the Civil War, or the 
Founding. Among the more immediate causes of this are the nomi-
nation or appointment of controversial Justices, interest in our insti-
tutions kindled by the Bicentennial, increased scholarly concern 
during the last two decades, particularly among political scientists 
and historians, with American political thought and institutions, 
and widespread public and scholarly questioning of the dominant, 
liberal consensus regarding the rule of the Court and the nature of 
constitutional jurisprudence. But whatever the immediate causes 
35. Professor of Political Science, Kenyon College. 
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of heightened interest in these matters, these are for us questions 
which are perpetually arising, for they reflect the fundamental ten-
sion between the dominant principles of our liberal democracy, a 
tension with which we have struggled since we became an independ-
ent nation. 
The Declaration of Independence proclaims that governments 
are instituted to secure rights and that they derive "their just pow-
ers from the consent of the governed . . . . " The tension between 
these principles of liberty and consent-of natural justice and ma-
jority rule-permeates American political life and is at the center of 
different views regarding the proper role of the Supreme Court. 
Those who advocate an activist, interventionist Court stress the im-
portance and precariousness of liberty or rights in liberal democ-
racy. In their view, the Court's political independence and status as 
the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution particularly fit it to 
be the protector of the people's liberties against the actions or inac-
tion of governmental officials and of the majority acting through 
government. Those who advocate a more restrained, deferential 
Court stress the threat to self-government and majority rule posed 
by an activist Court which is not electorally accountable. In their 
view, the Court should be restrained by strict adherence to the 
words of the Constitution and the intention of the framers. Other-
wise adjudication gives way to policymaking and judges substitute 
their own political preferences for the dictates of the Constitution. 
The libertarian and majoritarian views are both insufficient, in 
my view, because each tends to resolve the tension inherent in lib-
eral democratic principles by denying the legitimacy of the principle 
opposed to the one they embrace. Thus the majoritarians or inter-
pretivists tend to deny that our liberal democracy is grounded in 
enduring, transcendent principles of moral right. For their part, the 
libertarians or non-interpretivists are inclined to deny the moral sta-
tus of majority rule, although it, like the human rights they advo-
cate, is also a necessary implication of human equality. Moreover 
the rights jurisprudence, as formulated by scholars such as Ronald 
Dworkin, is grounded in a radical equalitarian reformulation of 
American political and constitutional principles. Under this dis-
pensation the undemocratic court becomes the vanguard of reform 
rather than the articulator of our enduring principles and the adju-
dicator of their unavoidable tensions. 
Constitutionally, the majoritarian, interpretivist advocates of 
restraint have failed to present a coherent, convincing jurisprudence 
of original intent. Similarly, the libertarian non-interpretivists have 
not shown how their jurisprudence of rights can be sufficiently 
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grounded in the Constitution so that judges do not become indistin-
guishable from legislators, thereby undermining the legitimacy of, 
and public respect for, the Court. 
Unavoidably, the Supreme Court is a political institution. The 
Constitution points to broad objects which cannot be adequately 
encompassed within a legalistic-historic formulation such as the 
search for original intention. Nor does the Constitution make an 
exception of the Supreme Court: as with the other two branches, its 
independence can and should be politically restrained by the other 
branches. As Tocqueville noted, in America Supreme Court judges 
must be statesmen. But they must also be judges, whose training 
and important, but not exclusive, responsibility for interpreting the 
Constitution make their work significantly different from that of the 
other two branches. 
Thus the most significant task for scholarship on the Court is, 
it seems to me, to articulate an alternative jurisprudence to the too 
narrow, restrictive view of the interpretivists and the open-ended, 
unrestrained approach of the non-interpretivists. Such a jurispru-
dence would be grounded in a sufficiently broad understanding of 
constitutionality to allow the Court ample scope for protecting lib-
erty. At the same time, it would be informed by the broad clauses 
and objects of the Constitution and the political thought which sup-
ports it, including the recognition that the Supreme Court itself em-
bodies, while it is also responsible for helping to resolve, the 
inherent tension in a liberal democracy between popular govern-
ment and liberty. 
DANIEL A. F ARBER36 
While there are exceptions, most of the major scholarship in 
the past ten years has focused on constitutional theory. We have 
seen endless debates about the role of text, original intent, and polit-
ical philosophy in constitutional law. Yet we seem to have learned 
little that is new about how to decide constitutional issues. 
The originalism debate is a good example. The originalist view 
is supposedly that the meaning of the Constitution is completely 
determined by the views of its framers. It is relatively easy to show 
that if "original intent" is supposed to be a matter of historical fact, 
it is difficult to define its meaning, ascertain its content, or explain 
why it should be determinative. (The basic error, of course, is tak-
ing "the consent of the governed" to be a matter of simple historical 
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